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PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY DATA MINING IN THE AFTERMATH OF SORRELL V.
IMS HEALTH: THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO PROTECT
PATIENT PRIVACY

Melody R. Hsiou
INTRODUCTION
Pharmaceutical companies and drug manufacturers have long used the practice of data
mining to increase sales and compete with generic drug makers. 1 Under law, pharmacies have
the duty to track prescriber specific data when physicians prescribe medications to their patients.2
Unbeknownst to most of the public and even prescribers, pharmacies then sell these raw data to
data mining companies that compile, analyze, and format the information to sell to
pharmaceutical companies.3 This data, which reveals the prescribing habits of physicians, has
proven to be highly valuable commodity that allows pharmaceutical companies to tailor sales
presentations to doctors in an effort to increase sales.4 However, this practice raises many
concerns about patient privacy and threatens the safety and integrity of sensitive health
information.
In response to these concerns and to stem rising health care costs, Vermont enacted the
Vermont Prescription Confidentiality Law in 2007.5 Vermont’s law broadly banned the use, sale
or transmission of prescriber-identifiable data without first obtaining the prescriber’s consent.
Several data mining companies, including, IMS Health, Source Healthcare Analytics, Inc., as
well as PhRMA, brought suit, alleging that the statute impermissibly infringed upon their
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The Confidentiality of Prescription Information Act is also known as “Act 80;”Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at
2660 ; The Vermont Prescription confidentiality Law, 2007 Vt. Acts and Resolves No. 80, §17 (2007).

freedom of speech under the First Amendment.6 In November 2010, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit issued its ruling that Vermont’s drug-marketing restrictions were
unconstitutional. 7 The Second Circuit then overturned the statute, holding that it was
unconstitutional for Vermont to restrict speech by data miners and pharmaceutical companies
without demonstrating a compelling state interest to do so.8
In June 2011, the Supreme Court likewise struck down the Vermont law in Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc. (Sorrell), on the grounds that it was a First Amendment violation to restrict
pharmaceutical marketers’ access to and use of prescription data for advertising purposes.9 The
decision in Sorrell has affected how state governments can regulate the data mining industry.10
This article will discuss the scope of Sorrell and its implications for data mining and patient
privacy, suggest that pharmaceutical data mining should be regulated based on personal privacy
concerns rather than commercial speech issues, and recommend that a patient-centered federal
statute is needed to protect patient privacy.
Part I will provide background of data mining practices and how the pharmaceutical
industry uses aggregated prescription data to increase profits through targeted advertising and
marketing. Part II will discuss data mining’s implications for medical privacy and confidentiality.
Part III will describe existing state and federal efforts to protect patient privacy and describe
cases that have been brought forth to challenge privacy laws. Part IV will argue that existing
privacy protections are not adequate, particularly in regard to protecting de-identified health data,
and discuss legal cases that illustrate these loopholes. Part V will argue that a comprehensive
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federal statute that protects patient privacy is needed, and lay out a recommended statute that is
centered on patient, rather than prescriber, privacy.
Finally, this Note concludes that although Sorrell invalidates existing state prescription
privacy laws, it leaves room for the creation of a much needed patient-centered federal statute
that protects patient privacy.
I.

PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY DATA MINING

The health care industry has been pushed in new information-technology driven directions.
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, part of
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, accelerates the goals of promoting the
adoption of electronic health records (EHRs) and health information technology (HIT) tools to
save costs and improve efficiency throughout the health care industry.11 A major component of
HITECH is the promotion of “meaningful use” of EHR systems through financial incentives
payable by federal healthcare programs.12 The meaningful use requirements, which include
capturing clinical data, reporting quality measures, and using automated clinical decision support
tools, have engendered the rapid growth of electronic health records. 13 The production of vast
quantities of electronically encoded health data raises many concerns for potential HIT misuse.14
The safety and integrity of electronic health records are primarily governed by the Privacy
and Security Rules of the Health Insurance Portability and Accessibility Act of 1996 (HIPAA).15
HITECH aims to strengthen HIPAA’s privacy rules by significantly increasing penalties and
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Hazewinkel, supra note 11 at 35.

reporting requirements.16 However, despite these efforts to protect electronic health data, the
“secondary use” of data still remains largely out of the realm of HIPAA’s scope. 17 Secondary
use of data refers to everything from the business use of communicating data for payment of
health services, to other activities such as public health reporting, biomedical research, and sales
marketing. 18 EHRs have largely streamlined the process of extracting information from raw data
by structuring data in discreet, common formats that can create longitudinal profiles on
patients.19 This technique has contributed to the pervasive use of data mining.
“Data mining” is a term that describes the process of identifying significant or interesting
data patterns that may be useful in decision making.20 Data mining has the potential to improve
management of data, increase business efficiencies, and support efficient delivery of care.
Through data mining, raw data can be interpreted and used for knowledge discovery in outcomes
research, epidemiology, drug and genome discovery, and biomedical research.21 Data mining
also has the potential to reveal unusual data patterns which might help detect disease outbreaks
or expose healthcare fraud and abuse.22 Data mining produces valuable data and may have many
medical and public health benefits when used correctly and with patient protections.
However, data mining also has the potential for threatening medical privacy and
confidentiality. This article will focus on pharmaceutical company data mining, which presents
serious invasions of physician and patient privacy. Pharmaceutical data mining is the business of
collecting information relating to prescribers’ prescribing habits and then selling them to data
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mining companies, which then sell detailed reports on prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical
companies.23 Pharmaceutical companies buy this valuable information to allow them to better
target their sales force, allowing them to increase their marketing efficiency and greatly increase
their profits.24
The protection of private health information is a major concern in the U.S. that has been
acknowledged by several state and federal privacy laws.25 On its face, the buying and selling of
personal health information for pecuniary gain seems to violate prescriber and patient privacy
rights. Indeed, data mining companies have admitted that prescriber-identifiable medical records
expose the intimate details of what doctors prescribe to their patients, potentially infringing on
physician-patient confidentiality.26 However, pharmaceutical companies purport to comply with
existing privacy laws by using only “de-identified” data that cannot be traced back to individual
patients. Unfortunately, the growth of mass data and electronic information makes deidentification of data a realistic threat that should be regarded as a major state interest.

II.

DATA MINING AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP AND
PATIENT PRIVACY

The collaboration of pharmacies, data miners, and pharmaceutical companies has created a
wealth of private health data that can be converted for commercial purposes. Using detailed
reports on prescribing habits of physicians, pharmaceutical sales representatives, or “detailers,”
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Heesters, supra note 20 at 790.
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Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191 (defining
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Brief for Respondent Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, On Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari, at 4, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 857 (Dec. 15, 2010) (No. 10-779).
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leverage the data to strategically target leading prescribers and design their presentations to
detract from competitors.27 Brand name drug manufacturers such as those represented by
PhRMA are required by patent law to market their brand name drugs to physicians and patients
in a very limited window of exclusivity.28 This time constraint, combined with fierce competition
from generic drug companies, have turned pharmaceutical data mining and targeted advertising
into an extremely lucrative business. 29
A. Negative Consequences of Pharmaceutical Data Mining
Pharmaceutical company data mining has many undesirable consequences. First, it may
interfere with physician’s prescribing practices and taint the physician-patient relationship.30
Data mining reports aggregate prescriber specific information to target doctors who prescribe
large quantities of drugs for certain conditions, doctors who regularly prescribe drugs from
competing companies, and doctors who may be identified as early adopters of drugs new to the
market.31 Detailers then tailor their in-person presentations to build and maintain brand loyalty
and highlight the weaknesses of competing drugs. 32 On average, primary care physicians
interact with at least twenty-eight detailers each week and average specialists see at least 14.33
These sales representatives also give prescribers around $1 million worth of free drug samples a
year, which are commonly distributed to patients at no charge to the doctor.34 Through these
incentives and regular in-person visits, detailers often form close personal relationships with
27
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David Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and the Protection of Patient’s Interests. 38 J.L. MED &
ETHICS 74 (2010).
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IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F. 3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2008).
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Smith, supra note 30 at 935.

physicians that create glaring conflicts of interest.35 For example, brand loyalty may possibly
predetermine a physician’s choice of which drugs to prescribe when there are more effective or
less expensive alternatives on the market. 36 The physicians’ duty to prioritize the patients’ best
interests may be overshadowed by these secretive marketing techniques. 37
Further, data mining and detailing drives up health care costs. Unlike generic drugs, brand
name drugs have a high profit margin for manufacturers. 38 On average, brand name drug
companies make an annual profit between 15% and 20%, placing their profit margins far above
those in other industries.39 The practices of detailing and data mining themselves are extremely
costly but very profitable; in 2005, one data mining company made $1.75 billion in revenue just
from selling prescriber data to brand name pharmaceutical companies.40 The amount of money
drug companies spend on detailing has more than doubled between 1998 and 2008, and
pharmaceutical companies now spend more money marketing to prescriber than they do to
marketing to consumers. 41This aggressive marketing of brand name drugs leads to
overprescribing of unnecessary or most costly drugs, resulting in greater costs to individuals,
insurers, and federal health care programs.42
While several states have statutes aimed to restrict the sale or use of identifiable prescriber
data for pharmaceutical companies’ sales purposes, the Supreme Court in Sorell has largely
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invalidated them.43 The Court based its decision on the theory that the statutes wrongfully
infringed on the free speech of the pharmaceutical companies’ sales representatives. 44 In doing
so, the Court has essentially given data miners the First Amendment right to use and sell private
health information without patients’ consent.45 The Sorrell Court’s focus on commercial speech
issues largely ignored a fundamental issue at hand, which is the violation of medical privacy
laws.46 Continuing to ignore these privacy interests will prove to be harmful as the use of
electronic health records proliferates and data becomes increasingly vulnerable.
B. The Importance of Protecting Patient Prescription PHI
The use and sale of personal health information (PHI) for commercial purposes should be
considered an intrusion of patient privacy that necessitates greater protections. In 2010,
Americans filled 3,703,594.389 prescriptions.47 Every one of those prescriptions discloses PHI
such as the patient’s name, age, gender, address, the date and location the prescription was filled,
the identity of the prescribing physician, and the identity and dosage of the drug prescribed.48
Prescription profiles could make it difficult for Americans who lack insurance to acquire
coverage.49Many consumers and insurance agents are not aware that large insurance companies
have access to applicants’ prescription histories.50 The prescription data, which includes possible
medical conditions and a numerical score predicting how much a person will cost an insurer, is

43

Sorrell, 131 S.Ct at 2653.
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Smith, supra note 30 at 932.
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Chad Terhune, They Know what’s in Your Medicine Cabinet, Businessweek Magazine (July 22, 2008),
www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-07-22/they-know-what’s-in-your-medicine-cabinet,.
50
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available in the form of online reports and cost only about $15 per search.51 In 2007, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) conducted an investigation on two companies that prepared these
prescription reports: MedPoint and IntelliScript.52 Companies like Medpoint and IntelliScript
purchase the data they disseminate mainly from pharmacy-benefit manager (PBM) companies
that provide services to insurers and employees53. In that capacity, the PBMS are able to broadly
access prescription information from drugstores. According to the FTC, there are no privacy
laws or regulations to prevent PBMs from gathering this data.54
The FTC investigation found that these two companies violated federal law because their
system was hidden from consumers.55 However, the FTC imposed no penalties and now merely
requires disclosure if prescription information causes denial of coverage or other adverse
actions.56 Furthermore, patients are not notified if the initial profile disclosure leads to requests
for more medical information that result in subsequent denial.57 Privacy advocates have
questioned how insurance carriers can ensure that they are obtaining accurate prescription
histories, especially with people with very common names.58 Further, there is also the concern
that widespread and legitimate off-label use of prescription drugs, such as the use of
antidepressants as a sleep aid, may cause unfair prejudice towards patients.59
In accordance with federal health privacy standards in HIPAA, PHI must be “de-identified”
or encrypted prior to being distilled and aggregated for prescription data reports. In order to meet
HIPAA standards, data must be sufficiently de-identified by removing certain factors such as
51

Terhune, supra note 49.
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name, age, and social security number so that it “cannot be linked to personal data by third
parties receiving the anonymous information.”60 HIPAA allows for two methods of deidentification: a statistical determination that the level of de-identification makes re-identification
unlikely, or the removal of a specific set of identifiers (the “safe harbor” method). 61 Once data is
de-identified, it is free from regulation under HIPAA. Unfortunately, especially with the safe
harbor method, there is evidence that certain information can be included in de-identified data
that may be unique to particular patients.
Most patients may share the view that one data is de-identified, it cannot be traced back to
them.62 However, all data has a unique signature that prevents it from ever being truly
identified.63 This signature, in combination with the longitudinal nature of a patient’s electronic
health record and the growing amount of publicly available personal information on the internet,
may allow data to be easily re-identified. Inadvertent data disclosures to secondary users such as
insurance companies and managed care evaluators may lead to discriminatory and exclusionary
treatment.64
The privacy interests in safeguarding these medical records is substantial and the "deidentification" techniques adopted by data-mining firms do not adequately protect patient
privacy.65 There are no uniform national standards that dictate the appropriate level of data

60

Christine Porter, De-Identified Data and Third Party Data Mining: The Risk of Re-identification of
Personal Information, 5 SHIDER J.L. COM. & TECH. 3, para. 8 (2008).
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National Institute of Health, The HIPAA Privacy Rule (Jan. 2004),
http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/research_repositories.asp.
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Nicolas P. Terry, Personal Health Records: Directing More Costs and Risks to Consumers?, 1 DREXEL
L. REV. 216 (2009).
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Pupo, supra note 14.
65
see Electronic Privacy Information Center, IMS Health v. Sorrell (Jun. 23, 2011),
http://epic.org/privacy/ims_sorrell/.

stripping necessary to insure against re-identification.66 To compound the problem, after the
initial breach of individual patient privacy through re-identification, there are no rules governing
additional and future re-identification. 67
Further, even if prescription PHI remains de-identified or encrypted, patients may feel unease,
embarrassment, or stress simply from knowing that their information is being disseminated and
used without their consent.68 Patients may be less likely to fill prescriptions for certain conditions,
or they may be less likely to seek health care.

III. EXISTING PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
A. Nation’s Interest in Protecting Medical Privacy: HIPAA Privacy and Security Rule and
HITECH
The nation has recognized its interest in protecting patient PHI by enacting existing legal
protections through HIPAA and the HITECH Act.69 The Privacy Rule, which is promulgated
pursuant to HIPAA, requires covered entities, defined as health plans, health care clearinghouses,
and health care providers who transmit health information electronically, to comply with
provisions governing the disclosure of protected health information.70 The Privacy Rule permits
limited uses and disclosures of protected health information, most notably disclosures for the
purposes of treatment, payment, and health care operations. 71

66

Terry, supra note 63, at 3 n.9.
Porter, supra note 60.
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Smith, supra note 30 at 932.
69
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936;
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2011).
70
Public Welfare Security and Privacy, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2010).
71
45 C.F.R. §164.502(a).
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The HITECH act amended HIPAA by requiring covered entities to notify affected
persons and HHS when unsecured PHI has been breached or subject to unauthorized
disclosure.72 HITECH further supplemented HIPAA by requiring business associates of covered
entities to comply with HIPAA’s privacy and security requirements.73
B. State Legislation Restricting the Release of Prescription Information
Several states have also recognized the need to protect patients’ right to privacy of PHI
within state constitutions and state privacy statutes.74 However, state courts are greatly varied in
the degree of protection they are willing to offer with regard to patient prescription PHI. 75 For
purposes of this discussion, this section will describe the specific state legislative responses to
data mining in detailing in New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine. Since 2007, each of these
three states has enacted statutes that aim to restrict the practice of data mining and using
prescription information for marketing and detailing purposes.76
In 2006, New Hampshire enacted the Prescription Information Law (PIL), which
prohibited the license, was the first state to create a statute with the goal of restricting data
mining of prescription information. The law prohibited the license, transfer, use, or sale of
patient-identifiable and prescriber-identifiable prescription information for certain commercial
purposes such as advertising, marketing, or promotion.77 This prohibition applied to “any activity
that could be used to influence sales or market share of a pharmaceutical product, influence or
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42 U.S.C. §17932 (2006).
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evaluate the prescribing behavior of an individual health care professional, or evaluate the
effectiveness of a professional pharmaceutical detailing sales force.”78
Vermont enacted a similar law in 2007, stating that pharmaceutical manufacturers,
marketers, electronic transmission intermediaries, pharmacies, and similar entities could not “sell,
license, or exchange for value regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable information,
nor permit the use of regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable information for
marketing or promoting a prescription drug, unless the prescriber consents.” The Vermont law
allowed prescribers to opt-in, thereby agreeing to allow the use of their prescriber-identifiable
data for marketing purposes.79
Finally, in 2008, Maine enacted an opt-out statute that allowed the use of prescriber data
for marketing purposes unless the prescriber chose confidentiality protections.80 As a part of
licensing applications, Maine prescribers could opt to protect their identifying information that
would be otherwise be used for marketing purposes by carriers, pharmacies, and prescription
drug intermediaries.81 If the prescriber opted out, carriers could not “license, use, sell, transfer or
exchange for value, for any marketing purpose, prescription drug information that identifies
directly or indirectly the individual.”82

IV. EXISTING LAWS DO NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT PATIENT PHI
A. State Prescription PHI Privacy Laws have been invalidated by Sorrell
Existing state statutes such as the ones in Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, have
been largely invalidated by the Sorrell decision. However, even if these statutes were upheld as
78
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they were, they contained several statutory weaknesses and arguably did not go far enough to
protect patient privacy. Namely, the statutes were targeted primarily at the data mining industry
and sought to regulate detailing from the prescribers’ perspective rather than the patients’.83 This
prescriber centered focus tends to create the notion that prescribers, not patients, are empowered
to control the flow of confidential information. 84
In addition, these statutes did not address protection of de-identified or encrypted patient
prescription PHI. 85 Only the Maine statute, in its phrase “identifies directly or indirectly,” can be
read to contain language that encompasses de-identified or encrypted PHI. 86 However, the
narrow application of restricting sales to only carriers and drug information intermediaries, and
only for marketing purposes, left room for entities such as researchers or drug manufacturers to
use prescription PHI for marketing and other purposes without violating the statute.87 All three
states prohibit the use of prescription for marketing purposes, but this narrow scope does not
address the legitimate desires that patients may have to protect their information from activities
other than marketing, such as in research studies.88
Another weak point of these statutes is that they fail to include clear compliance and
enforcement provisions.89 For example, the New Hampshire and Maine statutes both rely on data
miners, insurers, and pharmacies to monitor their own customers to prevent the transfer of
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prescription information for marketing purposes.90 In addition, the data-mining statutes are not
sufficiently transparent to raise awareness of statutory violations.91 None of the three statutes
contain clear provisions for how prescribers and patients would become aware of information
breaches or even become aware that their prescription information was being used to target them
through marketing techniques.92
In Sorrell, data mining companies argued that physicians did not opt-into the privacy
protection program and concluded that it was because they had no expectation of privacy.
However, the program was not widely publicized and many physicians were not aware that they
had the option. In some cases, physicians may not have even known that their prescribing habits
were being documented and did not understand the breadth and sophistication of detailing
practices. Although these statutes have been deemed unconstitutional, privacy concerns will
continue to become less speculative and more realistic, and should qualify as substantial state
interests that need to be addressed. 93
B. Professional Ethics Based Patient Privacy Protections Have not been Effective
Three major professional and ethical codes have also been developed to address concerns
stemming from data mining and detailing. The first code is the American Medical Association's
(AMA) Prescription Data Restriction Program (PDRP), which aims to curtail the use of
prescription PHI for marketing purposes.94 The PDRP gives prescribers the option to opt-in to a
data mining program that prohibits pharmaceutical companies from giving data to marketers for
90
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a period of three years, with an option to extend by the prescriber.95 Similar to the weakness
highlighted in the state statutes, the PDRP allows physicians instead of patients to restrict access
to prescription information.96
PhRMA’s professional code was also revised to demonstrate a commitment by PhRMA
to examine its own marketing practices and limit those that may be deemed inappropriate.97
However, PhRMA’s code is inadequate in that it also only addresses uses of prescriber data.98
Moreover, both the PDRP and PhRMA’s code have weak enforcement provisions that rely on
voluntary compliance of interested parties.99
The third ethical code is the American Pharmacists Association's (APhA) Code of Ethics
for Pharmacists, which requires pharmacists to place “concern for the well-being of the patient at
the center of professional practice” and to maintain privacy and confidentiality.100 Although this
is the only ethical code that specifically mentions patient privacy, it does not protect the
confidentiality of PHI that has been disclosed by pharmacists to third parties such as
pharmaceutical manufacturers.101 Thus, after information has been transmitted from a pharmacy
to a data miner or pharmaceutical manufacturer, the duty of confidentiality to no longer applies
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for information from the drug manufacturer to the patient.102 Notably, the PhRMA Code applies
only to pharmaceutical companies, leaving the data-collection industry completely
unregulated.103 Overall, the ethical codes regarding prescription PHI privacy do not place enough
emphasis on protecting the patients’ privacy interests and lack effective enforcement
mechanisms.104
C. HIPAA: Loopholes Allow for “Authorized” Disclosures of PHI
HIPAA allows individuals to obtain a list of who has accessed their PHI from their covered
entities.105 However, a loophole in HIPAA law allowed covered entities and other healthcare
providers to not report disclosures of PHI that pertained to health care operations.106 HITECH
contains mandatory enforcement penalties for “willful neglect” 107 and Congress expects there to
be a stronger position taken on enforcement of protecting individuals’ PHI. Under HITECH,
communications are not considered related to health care operations if the covered entity
receives a payment for making the communication.108However, a communication is no longer
considered a healthcare operation that requires an individuals’ authorization unless the
communication: (1)describes only the drug that is currently prescribed and there is a reasonable
amount of payment for the information; or (2) it is made by a covered entity or business
associate that has been authorized by the individual to whom it is making the communication.109
Therefore, it appears that pharmaceutical marketing practices, like the use of patient information
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sold by pharmacies to send letters encouraging prescription switches, may be acceptable under
HITECH.110
HIPAA does not offer strong privacy protections, if any, for de-identified prescription
PHI. Pursuant to the Privacy Rule of HIPAA, a covered entity’s use of prescription information
that is deemed to be de-identified or encrypted is open to unrestricted dissemination. The Privacy
Rule does not adequately protect de-identified PHI, stating that PHI is de-identified if “the
covered entity does not have actual knowledge that the information could be used alone or in
combination with other information to identify an individual who is a subject of the
information.”111 Further, the HIPAA Security Rule, which requires encryption to render
prescription “unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized individuals,” does not
create solutions for situations in which encrypted data becomes unencrypted and viewed by
unauthorized sources.112 The Security Rule considers encrypted prescription PHI to be secured
PHI, which creates a broad safe harbor for covered entities and business associates to avoid
liability for the unauthorized disclosure of protected health information. 113
In addition to the risk of re-identification and unencryption, privacy advocates fear that
HIPAA’s regulations do not go far enough to protect patient PHI, especially with the advent of
coordinated care delivery systems.114 For example, in 2007, the pharmacy chain CVS and the
pharmacy benefits manager Caremark merged to create the corporate entity CVS Caremark. In a
pending Texas lawsuit, Muecke Co. v. CVS Caremark Corp., plaintiffs allege that Caremark, the
benefits manager side of the entity, collected identifiable prescription health information, even
110
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for non-CVS prescriptions, and transferred that information to CVS pharmacies.115 For the
purpose of coordinating patients’ drug benefits, Caremark would receive the patient’s name, date
of birth, gender, phone number, social security number, address, prescription history, and the
prescriber and identity of the current prescription.116 Caremark would then use a common
information technology platform to share that information with the pharmacy side of CVS
Caremark, and that information would then be sold to drug companies for directly marketing to
patients who appeared to be likely candidates for a drug according to their prescription
histories.117 In addition, the complaint also states that CVS used patient information to “directly
target non-CVS patients and solicit their business to CVS-owned retail stores and their purchase
of CVS-branded products.” 118
In cases such as these, entities may skirt HIPAA regulations through creative corporate
structuring that allow for broad sharing of patient PHI. As a single corporate entity under HIPAA,
CVS Caremark could lawfully attain authorized access patient’s prescription PHI and then share
that information with CVS pharmacies for marketing purposes. In its Notice of Privacy Practices,
CVS Caremark indeed characterizes itself as an affiliated group of pharmacies that is treated as a
single entity for purposes of information sharing.119 Loopholes such as these, along with the risk
of re-identification, necessitate the creation of a comprehensive federal statute designed to
protect patient’s prescription PHI privacy.120
V. PROPOSED FEDERAL PATIENT PRIVACY LEGISLATION
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The Sorrell decision implies that the government cannot engage in “content” or
viewpoint” discrimination against marketers by prohibiting the commercial use of this data while
allowing its non-commercial use.121 Essentially, the government cannot regulate marketing and
other commercial speech differently than other types of speech simply because the speaker is a
corporation or the content of the speech is commercial.122 Under Sorrell, legislatures cannot
regulate the commercial use of data differently than non-commercial use, which seemingly
grants data miners the First Amendment right to use or sell private health information.123 The
New England statutes plainly discriminated against the content and viewpoint of detailer’s and
were held to violate freedom of speech, and similar statutes will likely be struck down. The
current patchwork of laws is inadequate and only protects some consumer data. However, there
remains significant government interest in regulating consumer data privacy, as evidenced by
California’s proposed Do Not Track legislation.124 This proposed act prohibits the general
collection of data that belongs to consumers who have opted out of online tracking, and does not
specifically target the commercial use of consumer data, making it acceptable under Sorrell.125
Nevertheless, the act provides broad exceptions for law enforcement, government, and research
uses, thus making it possible to discriminate against commercial data use.126

The Sorrell Court recognized that with the increasing capacity for technology to find and
publish personal information, serious and unresolved issues with respect to personal privacy and
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dignity remain. Notably, the court leaves room for new legislation, stating that “[i]f Vermont's
statute provided that prescriber-identifying information could not be sold or disclosed except in
narrow circumstances then the State might have a stronger position.”127 Thus, it is possible that
the court may accept a statute that provides patient privacy through a more narrowly tailored
means of restricting data.128 For instance, legislatures may want to consider universal opt-in or
opt-out schemes that allow consumers to choose when and for what purposes their personal data
can be used. The Court mentions using HIPAA as such an approach.129
Under HIPAA, health care providers and other covered entities are required to “give
individuals an understandable notice of the way in which personal health information will be
used and disclosed,” and to “make a good faith effort to obtain a written acknowledgement of
receipt of notice.”130 All healthcare providers must provide patients with notice of privacy
practices and obtain written acknowledgement of these practices.131 Once providers have given
notice and received consent, personal health information can be used for treatment, payment, and
healthcare operations purposes without further permission.132 All entities that wish to use
patients’ data must inform the patient ex ante of all the ways their data will be used.133 This
process resembles a universal “opt-in” scheme that applies to both commercial and noncommercial entities that might pass muster under the Sorrell Court.134

A. The Need for Patient Centered Protection
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Current laws create a system that allows pharmacies and data companies, rather than
patients, to own and control personal health data. Patients have a legitimate interest in protecting
prescription PHI that may reveal intimate details about their life and health. In particular, patients
currently lack protection for the privacy of their de-identified or encrypted prescription PHI.
HIPAA only applies to identifiable PHI and is more focused on simply providing notice to
patients regarding use of their PHI rather than allowing the patient to consent to such use.
Although PHI used by data mining companies is facially de-identified, advances in computer
science compromise the power of de-identification processes.135 A patient-centric approach
would empower patients to choose how data miners and pharmaceutical companies use their
prescription PHI.

B. Benefit of Federal Level Legislation
Any future statutory attempts to protect patient prescription PHI should be made at a
federal level for several reasons. First, a federal statute will create uniformity that will allow
courts to apply the same laws across the board as applied to prescription information sharing.136
This uniformity will be valuable to patients who may be subjected to different PHI privacy laws
by simply moving between states.137 The uniformity will also reflect the nature of the emerging
health care system, which rapidly accesses and interprets internet-based health records that may
be transmitted from several different locations. 138
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In addition to benefitting patients, a federal level statute will streamline processes for
covered entities that may otherwise struggle to comply with different levels of protection among
different states. In particular, large nationwide corporations will only have to comply with one
clear set of regulations, rather than dealing with the burden of meeting different state
requirements. 139 A federal standard will also help to create clear compliance standards and
enforcement practices. In terms of potential costs savings, efficiency, and simplicity, a federal
law that completely preempts state law would provide the most benefits.

C. Opt-in With Consent as a Major Requirement
Current federal and state laws only provide reactive privacy protection, meaning that
patients are not able to prevent unauthorized access to their prescription PHI but are only able to
file suit after a breach of privacy occurs. Future legislation to protection patient prescription PHI
should allow the patients a priori to choose if and how their information is used. A universal optin scheme that applies to both commercial and non-commercial entities may protect patient data
and offer patients granular control over their information. This type of approach is utilized by
Facebook applications, which are programs created by outside companies that run off Facebook
user data.140 Facebook users who wish to use these applications are presented with a dialogue
box that lists exactly what types of personal information the applications will use and asked for
permission. This approach offers a degree of transparency and differs from practices used by
websites like dictionary.com, which installs hundreds of tracking files on users’ computers
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without notice.141 The proposed federal legislation to track prescription PHI could mirror
Facebook privacy settings and allow patients to opt in to use for research, marketing, insurance
purposes. Certain exceptions may be made in public health emergencies, law enforcement,
payment, and treatment purposes. Patients should be able to change their preferred settings at any
time.

An opt-in scheme that provides several options for how patients would like their
prescription PHI released would be likely to pass constitutional First Amendment scrutiny. Optin provisions that allow patients to exercise meaningful choice over how their health information
is shared are necessary for the proliferation of health IT.142 Explicit consent systems will allow
patients to customize the balance between sharing and confidentiality. In the future, there will
ideally be a patient consent system that is editable over the internet and accessible by authorized
record holders.143 Future legislation to protection prescription PHI should also include
mechanisms that allow patients to track where their data goes and allow them to change their
preferences at any time. This may be accomplished by creating software that assigns patients to
codes that allow them and authorized users to track their information, whether it is identifiable,
de-identified, or encrypted. The tracking system must be secured against hacking and allow
patients and government regulators to detect breaches of PHI. Finally, HHS should reinforce the
deterrence of improper use by conducting audits of the tracking system. Patient empowerment
and government enforcement should deter violations of patient privacy.
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D. Obstacles to Implementation of a New Federal Statute

If the federal government chooses to pass an opt-in data privacy law in the wake of
Sorrell, it will face the tough challenge of deciding whether data privacy is worth the risk to
innovation and research.144 Opt-in data privacy schemes may negatively impact research,
innovation, and even privacy.145 For instance, one effect of an opt-in scheme for data privacy is
that it creates a dual cost structure in which the user must decide first if it is worth the time to
make the decision to opt-in; and second, whether the value of the service justifies the decision to
opt-in.146 This decision making process may have the effect of imposing a cost on the initial
recognition of a valuable opportunity or service, which may decrease the use of new services and
stifle innovation.147 Further, an opt-in scheme may create a demand for “single identity systems”
that allow users to use the same account to log in to multiple website, which would have an
excessive scope and would likely result in less consumer privacy.148 Next, consumers may
become desensitized after multiple data requests so that as the scope of data requests become
broader without awareness on the part of the user. Another potential negative effect would be
“balkanization,” which is a scenario where users may become reluctant to leave a service that
they have invested in and evaluated, which would result in a decrease in data mobility and a
subsequent decrease in consumer value and competition.149
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Open-data advocates have argued that patient privacy laws are paternalistic and harmful
to business and innovation.150 Currently, there are many means to obtain personal health
information outside of medical records or prescription PHI, such as through credit card purchases
or behavioral patterns.151 These methods are readily available and are not covered by HIPAA,
making efforts to truly anonymize data practically futile. Moreover, the de-identification and
anonymization of data may prevent it from being useful. Open-data proponents suggest that
medical professionals and commercial aggregators of data could continue to use health data
effectively by being honest about how consumers’ data will be used.152 This type of system is
supported by the proposed opt-in scheme that provides clear consent forms and mechanisms that
allow patients to control the dissemination of their own data. Patients who are confident about
how their data will be used may be more likely to share it, supporting the reusability, portability,
and integration of data.

State legislation and services like Google+ have demonstrated that consumers want to
share data categorically for some purposes but not with others.153 However, Sorrell prohibits
legislatures from tailoring data privacy laws to protect the use of data from commercial use.
Sorrell’s core rule, that laws must regulate commercial use of data in the same manner as noncommercial use, implies that schemes that apply universally to all data users, such as an opt-in
scheme, will be acceptable. However, present legislatures and users may not want to take the
step of a universal opt-in scheme. The new statute would present many obstacles to
implementation, the primary one being the costs of creating an effective tracking system. Further,
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a universal opt-in scheme may reduce desirable uses of health data, such as for public health
reports. Reducing the free flow of data may also stifle innovation and harm customer value.
Ultimately, the federal government may be unable to enact a universal scheme and may leave
consumer data privacy to private market or state control. Because legislation may fail to adapt to
new technology and may impose heavy financial burdens, many believe that market regulation is
preferable to government regulation.154 Private market data privacy policies, which can make
categorical distinctions among different types of data use, may be a sensible option in the wake
of Sorrell.

CONCLUSION
Current federal and state laws are inadequate for protecting the privacy of patient
prescription PHI. The exponential growth of electronic health records and electronically coded
data, and the weakness of existing state and federal privacy laws, necessitate the creation of a
comprehensive, patient-centered privacy statute that empowers patients to control and protect
their patient prescription PHI. This new law should also be designed to give stronger protection
to de-identified or encrypted PHI, which has been largely neglected by existing law. The reidentification or unencryption of this data can reveal details about the patients’ health and
lifestyle and subject them to unfair treatment by insurers and employers, as well as cause
embarrassment and stress.
The Sorrell Court decision implied that future legislative attempts to protect prescription
information privacy may be acceptable if they provided narrow and well-justified privacy
exceptions. A comprehensive, patient-centric federal level statute can uniformly protect the
privacy of prescription PHI in both identified and unidentified forms. The proposed statute will
154
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allow patients to exercise granular control over their own data through an opt-in scheme that is
transparent and well enforced. This type of statute is needed to empower patients to confidently
share their information and support the legitimate use of data to improve clinical outcomes.

